Accidental bequests: a curse for the rich and a boon for the poor*

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Abstract

When accidental bequests signal otherwise unobservable individual characteristics such as productivity and longevity, the population should be partitioned into two groups: those who do not receive an inheritance those who do. The first tagged group gets a second-best tax à la Mirrlees; the second group, when its type is fully revealed, a first-best tax schedule. Receiving an inheritance makes high-ability types worse off and low-ability types better off. High-ability individuals face a bequest tax of more than 100%, while low-ability types face a bequest tax that can be smaller as well as larger than 100% and may even be negative.

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1 Introduction

Little agreement exists in the literature concerning taxation of bequests in general. Yet, when it comes to accidental bequests, a widely-held view has formed that they should be taxed at one hundred percent. The rationalization for this argument is that a confiscatory rate combined with equal payments to offsprings or parents is equivalent to providing full insurance for the former or perfect annuities for the latter.\(^1\) The aim of our paper is to challenge this received view. Our contention is that publicly observable bequests have informational content that should be incorporated in the design of optimal tax structures. And that if this is done, the one-hundred percent tax rate on bequests is no longer optimal.

The basic idea is for the tax administration to use bequests as a separation mechanism, or a “tag,” when designing an optimal tax system. In this way, it can partition the population into two groups: one consists of people who do not receive an inheritance and the other of those who do. The information that inheritances convey about the ability and longevity of the individuals allows the government to offer two different Mirrleesian tax schedules to the two groups. A consequence of the welfare-enhancing differential tax treatment of the two groups is to undermine the desirability of the one-hundred percent tax rate on accidental bequests.

To make our point as stark and simplified as possible, we use a stylized model in which receiving bequests fully reveals one’s type. Under this circumstance, individuals with no inheritances face a standard Mirrleesian optimal nonlinear tax schedule. Those who receive an inheritance, on the other hand, face a non-distortionary tax scheme. Two interesting and inter-related results emerge. One is that inheritances make

\(^{1}\) Kaplow (2008, pp 264–66) argues that a 100% bequest tax, with its proceeds rebated equally to all children, mimics this insurance scheme and is non-distorting. Kopczuk (2003) points out that the market for annuities too, under certain conditions, can be mimicked by a government policy which includes 100% bequest taxes. In this scenario, one must give the retirees a wealth supplement and then fully tax the wealth of those who die early. However, the availability of wealth supplements rests on the individuals’ having strong bequest motives.
high-ability types worse off and the low-ability types better off. Second, the high-ability types should face a bequest tax that necessarily exceeds 100% but that the low-ability types face a tax rate that can be smaller or larger than 100% and may even be negative.\footnote{Ignoring the informational content of bequests in this setup calls for a 100% tax rate on bequests (within the context of the tax system as a whole and when tax instruments are not artificially restricted). The tax neither distorts the behavior of parents nor their utility because we rule out all bequest motives. The behavior of recipients is not distorted either as accidental bequests are a windfall for them. Moreover, as long as the inheritance tax they pay is determined as part of their total tax liabilities, the recipients will not become any worse off. This follows because the existence of a non-distortionary source of revenue reduces the amount of the distortionary tax that the government needs to raise. The optimal allocations must be independent of who initially owns the non-distortionary revenue sources.}

Blumkin and Sadka (2003) is, to our knowledge, the only paper that has questioned the wisdom of the 100% tax idea. In their setup, the tax system is linear. They argue that a non-confiscatory tax on accidental bequests has the desirable consequence of making the demogrant of an optimal linear income tax system effectively non-uniform. In this sense, it will act as an additional instrument and increases the efficiency of the tax system. Our challenge to the 100% tax idea is somewhat more basic and relies on the understanding that bequests have informational content that should be incorporated in the design of optimal tax structures.

That we ignore parents’ bequest motives does not mean that planned bequests do not matter. Nor do we claim that accidental bequests are the most important type of bequests. Their choice for this study is motivated by the fact that they are the only type of bequests for which there is a consensus as to how they should be taxed. Similarly, our approach is motivated by the fact that circumventing the identification of bequest motives simplifies the analysis drastically and highlights our point most succinctly. Nevertheless our central point that informational content of bequests should be incorporated in the design of optimal tax structures is a general one and applies to (i) all types of bequests regardless of bequest motives and to (ii) settings where receiving bequests do not fully reveal one’s type. Our result on the undesirability of a 100% tax on accidental bequests is also a general result that remains valid under (i) and (ii). The result that may not go through in a more general setting is that of high-ability
individuals facing a bequest tax of more than 100%.\footnote{Even here the result appears, at first glance, to generalize. Intuitively, one would expect that high-ability individuals enjoy less “informational rents,” and thus pay more taxes, as members of the group for which better information is available. In our problem, this is the group of individuals who receive an inheritance. This means that our result should hold even in this case. Yet, the literature on tax design with tagging has shown that this type of conjecture has to be interpreted with great care. Additional assumptions are needed to ensure this result.}

Finally, in emphasizing the informational content of bequests, the paper balances the availability of information with practical considerations. Thus we do not allow the tax liability of an individual to be based directly on his parents’ income. From a purely theoretical (mechanism) design perspective, this restriction is arbitrary. However, the assumption is a sensible one from a practical perspective. Tax schedules are often restricted to depend on contemporaneous variables only. A person’s income tax liability in a given period, for example, does not even depend on his full earning history. It is these practical considerations that motivate our conditioning an individual’s tax liability on his own transactions, income levels, or wealth, alone. Incorporating the available information on the previous generation does not significantly change our formal analysis. However, the interpretation of the results would change as the information that can be obtained from bequests could also be obtained from these other variables. Put differently, we would have a redundancy in the informational structure.

2 The setting

2.1 Basic model

Consider a two-period overlapping-generation model wherein individuals of each generation live either for one or two periods. Regardless of their longevity, they work in the first period only. Those whose parents die early (i.e., live for one period) receive an inheritance from their parents; those whose parents live for two periods receive nothing. There are no annuity markets. All individuals, at the beginning of period one, allocate their resources—earnings plus any inheritances—between present consumption and saving to be consumed when retired. If individuals stay alive in the second period, they will
consume all their savings and leave no bequests; if they die early, their unused saving is transmitted to their children as an accidental bequest. Saving is channeled into future consumption through a storage technology; there is no appreciation or depreciation of savings so that the interest rate is zero.\footnote{The important assumption here is the constancy of the interest rate rather than having it to respond to changes in savings and capital accumulation. This is customarily done either by assuming a storage technology or postulating a small open economy whose savings does not change the interest rate it faces. Observe also that, as long as the interest rate is constant, setting it at a positive rate rather than zero does not change the analysis.}

Individuals differ in their productivity $w_i$, their survival probability $\pi_i$, and taste for future versus present consumption represented by a weight $\beta_i$ to future consumption in the individuals’ utility functions. We assume, based on empirical evidence, that these characteristics are positively correlated. Preston (1975), Duleep (1986), Pritchett and Summers (1996), Deaton and Paxson (1998), Waldron (2007) and Sahn (2007), among others, all point to a positive relationship between income/education and life expectancy.\footnote{Studying U.S. data, Singh and Siahpush (2006) show that not only has life expectancy been steadily increasing over the past several decades, but that accompanying these increases has been a growing disparity in life expectancy between individuals with high and low income and between those with more and less education. Differences in life expectancy across socioeconomic groups are significantly larger now than in 1980 or 1990. A similar trend is observed in a number of other countries.} Saez (2002) argues that individuals with higher earnings save relatively more which suggests that high-ability individuals are likely to have a higher taste for savings. Banks and Diamond (2010) nurture similar ideas. Finally, Bommier (2006) provides empirical support for a positive correlation between longevity and preferences for savings.

To simplify, we also assume that each characteristic takes only two values: “high” indexed by $h$ and “low” indexed by $\ell$. The two-value simplification implies that the assumed positive correlation between the specified characteristics is perfect. This means that, effectively, we have only two types of agents: $h$ and $\ell$ with $w_h > w_\ell, \pi_h > \pi_\ell$, and $\beta_h > \beta_\ell$.\footnote{It is sufficient to assume $\pi_h \geq \pi_\ell$ and $\beta_h \geq \beta_\ell$ with one of the two inequalities being strict.} Moreover, types are assumed to be dynastically immutable: if a person is of type $i$, his offspring will also be of type $i$. These are, of course, over-simplifications. But...
they have the advantage of greatly simplifying the multi-dimensional screening problem that arises when individuals differ in more than one dimension.\footnote{Without perfect correlation, it is often impossible to determine which incentive constraints are binding at the second-best solution. For a discussion of multi-dimensional heterogeneity in the context of capital and wealth taxation, see Cremer et al. (2003) and, more recently, Diamond and Spinnewijn (2010).}

Nevertheless their adoption does not impact our central message (although they will affect our specific results below). That informative bequests should serve as a separating mechanism in the design of optimal tax structures and that doing so does away with the received view of the 100% taxation of accidental bequests are invariant to this assumption.\footnote{In Cremer et al. (2010), for example, correlation between earnings and gender used as tag is far from perfect. Yet they show that tagging based on gender, i.e. offering males and females different tax schedules, is welfare improving. However, in the absence of these assumptions, the underlying tagging problem becomes significantly more complicated. See the Conclusion for further discussion of this issue.}

There is no population growth and each generation consists of $n_i$ individuals of type $i$, where $n_h + n_\ell = 1$. Individuals have additive quasi-linear preferences over present consumption, $c_i$, future consumption, $d_i$, and labor supply, $L_i$.\footnote{This assumption simplifies the analysis and exposition of our results. It is not crucial for the main results of this paper concerning the properties of first- and second-best allocations (and the associated tax policies). These result, derived below, carry over with only minor modifications to a setting with general preferences . See the last paragraph in the Conclusion.}

An individual’s expected utility is given by

$$U_i = \pi_i [c_i + \beta_i \phi (d_i) - \varphi (L_i)] + (1 - \pi_i) [c_i - \varphi (L_i)]$$

$$= c_i + \pi_i \beta_i \phi (d_i) - \varphi (L_i), \quad i = h, \ell,$$  \hspace{1cm} (1)

where $\phi$ is strictly concave while $\varphi$ is strictly convex.\footnote{This formulation assumes that an individual derives no utility from leaving an accidental bequest for his family if he dies early. Moreover, that the same amount of consumption yields different utility levels in the two periods, $c$ and $\phi(d)$, indicates differing intertemporal preferences. Finally, concavity of $\phi(d)$ reflects risk aversion.}

Individuals of the first generation start life with no initial wealth. This will not be the case for members of the generations that follow, however. Those who die early leave an accidental bequest which, unless taxed away, is inherited by their children. Consequently, besides $w_i, \pi_i$ and $\beta_i$, individuals of the second and forthcoming generations...
will differ also on the basis of their inherited wealth, \( \omega_i \). The quasi-linearity of the utility function (1) ensures that the size of one’s (accidental) bequest to his children is unaffected by the size of the inheritance that he may have received from his own parents (including zero). We will then have, in each period, four groups of people: \( h \)-types with either \( \omega_h \) or no inherited wealth and \( \ell \)-types with either \( \omega_\ell \) or no inherited wealth. \(^{11}\)

### 2.2 Laissez-faire

Recall that there is no annuity market and that private saving, \( s_i \), is the only source for financing one’s consumption during retirement years. The optimization problem of an \( i \)-type individual \( (i = h, \ell) \) in the first generation is

\[
\max_{s_i, L_i} U_i = w_i L_i - s_i + \pi_i \beta_i \phi (s_i) - \varphi (L_i), \tag{2}
\]

where we have substituted \( w_i L_i - s_i \) for \( c_i \), and \( s_i \) for \( d_i \), in the individual’s expected utility given by equation (1). The optimization yields \( \pi_i \beta_i \phi' (s_i) = 1 \), or \( s_i = \phi'^{-1} (1/\pi_i \beta_i) \), and \( w_i = \varphi' (L_i) \). These relationships, along with the assumptions \( \pi_h > \pi_\ell, \beta_h > \beta_\ell \), strict concavity of \( \phi \), and strict convexity of \( \varphi \), imply that \( s_h > s_\ell \) and \( L_h > L_\ell \). Finally, observe that since in the absence of annuity markets every \( i \)-type person saves \( s_i \) to finance his future consumption, those who die early must leave an accidental bequest of \( s_i \) behind. That is, \( \omega_i = s_i \).

The optimization problem of individuals belonging to second and forthcoming generations depends on whether they inherit an initial wealth or not. Those who receive no inheritance have an identical optimization problem to that of the first generation. This continues to be summarized by (2), resulting in the same solution as those obtained for the first generation. In particular, a second-generation \( i \)-type with no inheritance will save the same amount as a first-generation \( i \)-type. It then also follows that any bequest

\(^{11}\)Dependence of the bequest one leaves on the inheritance one receives leads to multiplicity of groups on the basis of \( \omega_i \), making existence of a steady state problematic. Observe also that even with quasi-linear preferences \( \omega_i \) may take more than two values if the prices (tax rates) that individuals face depend on their inheritance status. We discuss this issue below when addressing second-best allocations and their implementation.
left by a second-generation \( i \)-type with no inheritance will be identical to that of the first-generation \( i \)-type: \( \omega_i = s_i \).

Second-generation individuals who inherit an initial wealth have an optimization problem summarized by

\[
\max_{\hat{s}_i, \hat{L}_i} \hat{U}_i = w_i \hat{L}_i + \omega_i - \hat{s}_i + \pi_i \beta_i \phi (\hat{s}_i) - \varphi (\hat{L}_i),
\]

where the symbol \(^\wedge\) over a variable indicates that it refers to a person who has received an inheritance, and we have substituted \( w_i \hat{L}_i + \omega_i - \hat{s}_i \) for \( c_i \) and \( \hat{s}_i \) for \( d_i \). The quasi-linearity of preferences implies that future consumption and labor supply do not depend on inherited wealth so that \( \hat{s}_i = s_i \) and \( \hat{L}_i = L_i \). However, present consumption increases with wealth and \( \hat{c}_i > c_i \). Clearly, with \( \hat{s}_i = s_i \), \( \hat{\omega}_i = \omega_i \) and equal to the bequest of an \( i \)-type of the first generation. Finally, with \( s_h > s_\ell \) and \( L_h > L_\ell \), it thus also follows that \( \hat{s}_h > \hat{s}_\ell \) and \( \hat{L}_h > \hat{L}_\ell \).

The quasi-linearity assumption ensures that, starting with generation two, the economy is in a stationary-state equilibrium. After that, the equilibrium values of all the variables remain invariant to time. Specifically, in every period, there will always be \( n_\ell \) unskilled and \( n_h \) skilled individuals. Of the unskilled workers, \( n_\ell (1 - \pi_\ell) \) have an initial wealth equal to \( \omega_\ell = s_\ell \) and the remaining \( n_\ell \pi_\ell \) have no wealth; of the skilled workers, \( n_h (1 - \pi_h) \) have an initial wealth \( \omega_h = s_h \) and \( n_h \pi_h \) have no wealth. And, with \( s_h > s_\ell \), it is also the case that \( \omega_h > \omega_\ell \).

3 First-best

3.1 Allocation

Assume there is full information. In particular, individual types \( i = h, \ell \), as well as the size of their inherited wealth (whether zero or \( \omega_i \)), are publicly observable. The first-best policy is attained when the government chooses \( (c_i, d_i, L_i) \) and \( (\hat{c}_i, \hat{d}_i, \hat{L}_i) \) to
maximize social welfare defined by

\[ W = \sum_{i=h,\ell} n_i \left[ \pi_i v(U_i) + (1 - \pi_i) v(U_i) \right], \quad (4) \]

where \( v \) is a strictly concave transformation of the quasi-linear utility function \( (1) \); hence \( v' > 0 \) and \( v'' < 0 \). Aside from this transformation, the social welfare function defined by \( (4) \) is utilitarian in form in that it aggregates the utilities of the four groups—\( h- \) and \( \ell- \)types, each with and without an inheritance—and assigns each a weight according to their numbers in the society. The role of \( v \) is to make the social welfare function redistributive. Without such a transformation, there will be no aversion to inequality and thus no redistribution. Observe also that the more concave \( v \) is the more redistributive the social welfare function will be. One common specification for \( v \) is the iso-elastic case \( v(U) = U^{1-\varepsilon}/(1-\varepsilon) \), \( \varepsilon \neq 1 \), suggested by Atkinson (1973). In this formulation, \( \varepsilon > 0 \) denotes the inequality aversion index and the higher is \( \varepsilon \) the greater will be the desired redistribution.

The resource constraint for the economy is given by

\[ \sum_{i=h,\ell} n_i \left[ \pi_i (w_i L_i - c_i - \pi_i d_i) + (1 - \pi_i) \left( w_i \hat{L}_i - \hat{c}_i - \pi_i \hat{d}_i \right) \right] \geq 0. \quad (5) \]

The specification of this constraint implies that the resources available to any generation are spent in full, with the inheritances that any generation receives offsetting the bequests it leaves.\(^{12}\) First-best optimum is then characterized by choosing \((c_i, d_i, L_i)\) and \((\hat{c}_i, \hat{d}_i, \hat{L}_i)\) to maximize \( (4) \) subject to \( (5) \).\(^{13}\) Let \( \mu \) denote the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the resource constraint \( (5) \). The Lagrangian expression associated with this problem is

\[ \mathcal{L} = \sum_{i=h,\ell} n_i \left\{ \pi_i [v(c_i + \pi_i \beta_i \phi(d_i) - \varphi(L_i)) + \mu (w_i L_i - c_i - \pi_i d_i)] \right\} + \]

\(^{12}\)While inheritances one generation receives may in principle be different from the bequests it leaves, such an outcome cannot happen in the steady state.

\(^{13}\)There is also the constraint that \( s_i = w_i L_i - c_i \geq 0 \), which we assume to be non-binding.
It follows from the first-order conditions of the above problem that, for $i = h, \ell$,

$$v'(U_i) = v'(\hat{U}_i) = \mu, \tag{7}$$

$$\beta_i\phi'(d_i) = \beta_i\phi'(\hat{d}_i) = 1, \tag{8}$$

$$\varphi'(L_i) = \varphi'(\hat{L}_i) = \mu w_i. \tag{9}$$

Denoting the first-best values by superscript $FB$, it follows from (8)–(9) that

$$\hat{U}_i = U_i \equiv U_{FB}, \tag{10}$$

$$\hat{d}_i = d_i \equiv d_{FB} > \hat{d}_i = d_{FB}, \tag{11}$$

$$\hat{L}_i = L_i \equiv L_{FB} > \hat{L}_i = L_{FB}, \tag{12}$$

where the first inequality sign follows from $\beta_h > \beta_{\ell}$ and the strict concavity of $\phi$, and the second from $w_h > w_\ell$ and the strict convexity of $\varphi$. Observe also that equations (10)–(12) imply

$$\hat{c}_i = c_i \equiv c_{FB},$$

so that, at the first-best, the difference in type affects one’s allocation but not the difference in inheritance status. Put differently, allocations of $h$- and $\ell$-types differ but either one gets the same allocation regardless of receiving an inheritance or not.

### 3.2 Tax policy

We now show that the government is able to decentralize the first-best allocations through a combination of saving subsidies and lump-sum taxes. Saving subsidies need to be conditioned on types, but not on inherited wealth, and set at a rate equal to

$$\tau_i = 1 - \pi_i, \tag{13}$$
for type $i = h, \ell$.\textsuperscript{14} Lump sum taxes, which can be negative as well as positive, on the other hand, must be conditioned on types as well as inherited wealth: $(\hat{t}_h, \hat{t}_\ell)$ for those with an inheritance and $(t_h, t_\ell)$ for those without. Naturally, these fiscal instruments must also satisfy the government’s budget constraint

$$
\sum_{i = h, \ell} n_i \left[ \pi_i (t_i - \tau_is_i) + (1 - \pi_i) (\hat{t}_i - \tau_i\hat{s}_i) \right] = 0.
$$

To see how the optimum is decentralized, observe that the presence of $\tau_i, \hat{t}_i,$ and $t_i$ changes the budget constraints of the $i$-type with and without an inheritance to

\begin{align*}
    c_i + (1 - \tau_i) s_i &= w_i L_i + \omega_i - \hat{t}_i, \\
    c_i + (1 - \tau_i) s_i &= w_i L_i - t_i.
\end{align*}

The first-order conditions for the $i$-type’s optimization problem, with or without an inheritance, yield $\varphi'(L_i) = w_i$ and

$$
\pi_i \beta_i \phi'(s_i) = 1 - \tau_i = \pi_i.
$$

These are identical to their first-best counterparts resulting in $\hat{L}_i = L_i = L_i^{FB}$ and $\hat{s}_i = s_i = s_i^{FB}$. Additionally, to ensure $\hat{c}_i = c_i = c_i^{FB}$, one must set lump-sum taxes at the rates $t_i = w_i L_i^{FB} - c_i^{FB} - \pi_i s_i^{FB}$ and $\hat{t}_i = w_i L_i^{FB} + \omega_i - c_i^{FB} - \pi_i s_i^{FB}$.

Finally, observe that the expressions for $\hat{t}_i$ and $t_i$ show that $\hat{t}_i = t_i + \omega_i$. Now, given identical tax rates on savings, it is natural to consider the difference between $\hat{t}_i$ and $t_i$ as the tax on bequests. Alternatively, one can consider the bequest tax to be the difference between one’s total tax liabilities when he receives an inheritance and when he does not. There is no tension between these definitions, however. Given identical savings under the two scenarios ($\hat{s}_i = s_i$), both definitions lead to the same answer:\textsuperscript{15} The implementation

\textsuperscript{14}The subsidy is required because there is no annuity market. The absence of such a market implies that the private cost of future consumption $d$, as perceived in the first period when one does not know if he will be alive in the second period, exceeds its social cost. A Pigouvian subsidy corrects for this divergence.

\textsuperscript{15}Denote the net taxes an $i$-type pays, $i = h, \ell$, by $T_i$ if he does not receive an inheritance and by $\hat{T}_i$ if he does. It must then be the case that $T_i = t_i - \tau_is_i$ and $\hat{T}_i = \hat{t}_i - \tau_i\hat{s}_i$. With $t_i = \hat{t}_i - \omega_i$ and $s_i = \hat{s}_i$, it also follows that $T_i = \hat{T}_i - \omega_i$. 

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of first-best allocations requires a 100% taxation of (accidental) bequests. The \( i \)-type with an inheritance \( \omega_i, i = h, \ell, \) sees his entire inheritance “confiscated,” after which he is treated like his counterpart with no inheritance.

The main results of this section are summarized in the following proposition.

**Proposition 1** Consider a society with two types of individuals \( i = h, \ell, \) whose preferences are defined by (1). The types are identified by their productivity \( w_i, \) their survival probability \( \pi_i, \) and the utility weight they assign to their consumption in retirement \( \beta_i. \) The type characteristics are dynastically immutable and satisfy the property \((w_h, \pi_h, \beta_h) > (w_{\ell}, \pi_{\ell}, \beta_{\ell}).\)

(i) First-best allocations are characterized by (a) equalization of utilities of all individuals regardless of their type and inheritance status: \( \hat{U}_h = U_h = \hat{U}_{\ell} = U_{\ell}, \) and (b) a higher accidental bequest for individuals of type \( h: \omega_h > \omega_{\ell}.\)

(ii) Decentralization of first-best allocations requires: (a) Saving subsidies conditioned on individual survival probabilities, but not on inherited wealth, set at a rate equal to \( \tau_i = 1 - \pi_i \) for type \( i, \) and (b) lump sum taxes conditioned on types (specifically wages) as well as inherited wealth: \((t_h, \ell)\) for those with an inheritance and \((t_h, t_{\ell})\) for those without.

(iii) All accidental bequests are taxed at 100%.

4 Second-best

4.1 Allocation

Define the second-best as a setting wherein individual types, \( i.e., \) the characteristics \((w_i, \pi_i, \beta_i), \) and labor supplies, \( L_i, \) are not publicly observable. The observables are gross earnings \((\hat{I}_i = w_i \hat{L}_i, I_i = w_i L_i), \) consumption during working years and retirement \((\hat{c}_i, \hat{d}_i; c_i, d_i), \) and bequests \( \omega_i. \) This follows the traditional information structure in optimal non-linear income tax models à la Mirrlees. The only difference is that we have
added bequests as an observable variable and thus potentially taxable.\textsuperscript{16} The key point that we make is that observability of bequests is sufficient to identify its recipient’s type. On the other hand, the type of an individual who receives no inheritance remains unknown to the government. Given this information structure, the tax administration uses an individual’s inheritance as a separation mechanism, or a “tag,” when designing an optimal tax system.\textsuperscript{17}

We start by assuming that the government is able to identify the type of a person who receives a bequest and then show that this is in fact the case. Given this assumption, the government proceeds to partition the population into two groups: Those who receive an inheritance and those who do not (tagged as “positive inheritance” and “zero inheritance”). The zero-inheritance group, consisting of people whose ability remains private information, will have to face a tax schedule determined on the basis of Mirrlees’ standard optimal non-linear income tax problem. The positive-inheritance group, on the other hand, need not face a second-best tax schedule. This group consists of people whose characteristics can be inferred from the level of the inheritance they receive. Hence a full information solution can be achieved within this group.

To describe the optimal tax policy, we first characterize the optimal allocation constrained by the information structure just sketched. As is commonly done in the literature on tagging, one can formulate the problem within each group independently; connecting the two via the economy’s resource constraint.\textsuperscript{18} Put differently, one assigns a single resource constraint to the two groups. This continues to be represented by (5). Let \( \mu \) denote the Lagrange multiplier associated with the economy’s resource constraint, and \( \lambda \) the multiplier associated with the incentive constraint in the group

\textsuperscript{16}Recall that throughout the paper we assume that an individual’s tax liability depends only on variables pertaining to the individual himself: income, consumption, and inheritances received. Socio-political considerations prevent the government to condition a person’s tax liability on his parents’ characteristics.

\textsuperscript{17}Akerlof (1978) is the classic paper on tagging. Boadway and Pestieau (2006), and Cremer et al. (2010), are among the more recent contributions to this literature.

\textsuperscript{18}See, e.g., Cremer et al. (2010).
of individuals who receive no inheritance.\textsuperscript{19} The Lagrangian expression associated with this optimization problem is

$$\mathcal{L} = \sum_{i=h,\ell} n_i \left\{ \pi_i \left[ v \left( c_i + \pi_i \beta_i \phi(d_i) - \varphi \left( \frac{I_i}{w_i} \right) \right) + \mu \left( I_i - c_i - \pi_i d_i \right) \right] \ight. \\
+ (1 - \pi_i) \left[ v \left( \tilde{c}_i + \pi_i \beta_i \phi(\tilde{d}_i) - \varphi(\tilde{I}_i) \right) + \mu \left( \tilde{w}_i \tilde{L}_i - \tilde{c}_i - \pi_i \tilde{d}_i \right) \right] \}\right\} \\
+ \lambda \left[ c_h + \pi_h \beta_h \phi(d_h) - \varphi \left( \frac{I_h}{w_h} \right) - c_\ell - \pi_h \beta_h \phi(d_\ell) + \varphi \left( \frac{I_\ell}{w_h} \right) \right]. \quad (14)$$

In writing (14), we have followed the common practice of writing the problem in terms of the (observable) pre-tax income for individuals in the zero-inheritance group (writing labor supply as $I_i/w_i$). People in the positive-inheritance group face no incentive constraint; their earning abilities are observable. Here, to stress the first-best nature of the problem within this group, we specify the decision variable to be $\tilde{L}_i$—an observable as in Section 3.\textsuperscript{20}

Observe that bequests do not appear directly in the economy’s resource constraint. This follows because bequests are simply a transfer between generations, with the inheritances one generation receives offsetting the bequests it leaves. However, bequests appear indirectly in (14), being the defining characteristic of zero- and positive-inheritance groups. It is because of the information that bequests convey that (14) does not contain an incentive constraint for people in the positive-inheritance group.

The first-order conditions for $i = h, \ell$ are, for people with an inheritance:

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial c_i} = n_i (1 - \pi_i) \left[ v' \left( \tilde{U}_i \right) - \mu \right] = 0, \quad (15)$$
$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial d_i} = n_i (1 - \pi_i) \left[ v' \left( \tilde{U}_i \right) \pi_i \beta_i' \left( \tilde{d}_i \right) - \mu \pi_i \right] = 0, \quad (16)$$
$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial L_i} = n_i (1 - \pi_i) \left[ -v' \left( \tilde{U}_i \right) \phi' \left( \tilde{L}_i \right) + \mu w_i \right] = 0. \quad (17)$$

\textsuperscript{19}In this group, the government does not observe an individual’s type. Consequently, the designed tax policy must be incentive compatible; that is, the policy must induce self-selection.

\textsuperscript{20}Although one can equally express the problem in terms of $\tilde{I}_i$. 

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and for those without an inheritance:

\[
\frac{\partial L}{\partial c_h} = n_h \pi_h \left[ v' (U_h) - \mu \right] + \lambda = 0, \tag{18}
\]

\[
\frac{\partial L}{\partial d_h} = n_h \pi_h \left[ v' (U_h) \pi_h \beta_h \phi' (d_h) - \mu \pi_h \right] + \lambda \pi_h \beta_h \phi' (d_h) = 0, \tag{19}
\]

\[
\frac{\partial L}{\partial c_\ell} = n_\ell \pi_\ell \left[ v' (U_\ell) - \mu \right] - \lambda = 0, \tag{20}
\]

\[
\frac{\partial L}{\partial d_\ell} = n_\ell \pi_\ell \left[ v' (U_\ell) \pi_\ell \beta_\ell \phi' (d_\ell) - \mu \pi_\ell \right] - \lambda \pi_\ell \beta_\ell \phi' (d_\ell) = 0, \tag{21}
\]

\[
\frac{\partial L}{\partial I_\ell} = n_\ell \pi_\ell \left[ - v' (U_\ell) \frac{1}{w_\ell} \phi' \left( \frac{I_\ell}{w_\ell} \right) + \mu \right] - \frac{\lambda}{w_\ell} \phi' \left( \frac{I_\ell}{w_\ell} \right) = 0. \tag{22}
\]

Consider first the group who receive an inheritance. Simplifying and rearranging equations (15)--(17) yields, for \( i = h, \ell, \)

\[
v' \left( \hat{U}_i \right) = \mu, \quad \beta_i \phi' \left( \hat{d}_i \right) = 1, \quad \text{and} \quad \phi' \left( \hat{L}_i \right) = w_i. \tag{24}
\]

This is the same characterization as in the first best indicating no distortion on either labor supply or future consumption. This is not surprising. We have a first-best solution for the people in positive-inheritance group because their characteristics are observable. Equations (24) also imply, as with the first-best solution, \( \hat{U}_h = \hat{U}_\ell, \quad \hat{d}_h > \hat{d}_\ell, \) and \( \hat{L}_h > \hat{L}_\ell. \) That is, in the positive-inheritance group, the utility levels for high- and low-ability types are equalized, but that a high-ability type consumes more in the second period, and works more in the first, as compared with a low-ability type.

Turning to the group whose members do not receive an inheritance, equations (18)--(23) yield

\[
v' (U_h) = \mu - \frac{\lambda}{n_h \pi_h}, \tag{25}
\]

\[
\beta_h \phi' (d_h) = 1, \tag{26}
\]

\[
\frac{1}{w_h} \phi' \left( \frac{I_h}{w_h} \right) = 1. \tag{27}
\]
\( v'(U_{\ell}) = \mu + \frac{\lambda}{n_{\ell} \pi_{\ell}}, \) (28)

\[
\beta_{\ell} \phi'(d_{\ell}) = 1 + \frac{\lambda \phi'(d_{\ell})}{\mu n_{\ell} \pi_{\ell}} \left[ \beta_h \frac{\pi_h}{\pi_{\ell}} - \beta_{\ell} \right],
\] (29)

\[
\frac{1}{w_{\ell}} \varphi' \left( \frac{I_{\ell}}{w_{\ell}} \right) = 1 + \frac{\lambda}{\mu n_{\ell} \pi_{\ell}} \left[ \frac{1}{w_h} \varphi' \left( \frac{I_h}{w_h} \right) - \frac{1}{w_{\ell}} \varphi' \left( \frac{I_{\ell}}{w_{\ell}} \right) \right].
\] (30)

Equations (25)–(30) show that taxation of individuals with no initial wealth subscribes to the customary properties of second-best income taxation. Specifically, equations (26)–(27) yield the “no distortion at the top” result (applying to both \( d_h \) and \( L_h \)). In other words, for any pair of goods (including leisure), the tradeoff that the "top"—the high-ability individuals—face in the second-best is the same as in the first best. This implies, in particular, that in the second-best too, the marginal tax on labor income is zero for the high-ability individuals. Turning to equations (29)—(30), with \( (w_h, \pi_h, \beta_h) > (w_{\ell}, \pi_{\ell}, \beta_{\ell}) \), the bracketed expressions in their right-hand sides are both positive. Consequently, the left-hand sides of (29) and (30) exceed one: \( \beta_{\ell} \phi'(d_{\ell}) > 1 \) and \( w_{\ell} > \varphi'(L_{\ell}) \). In words, consumption of \( d_{\ell} \) and supply of \( L_{\ell} \) are distorted downward. Finally, comparing \( \beta_h \phi'(d_h) = 1 \) with \( \beta_{\ell} \phi'(d_{\ell}) > 1 \) and \( w_h = \varphi'(L_h) \) with \( w_{\ell} > \varphi'(L_{\ell}) \), in conjunction with strict concavity of \( \phi \) and strict convexity of \( \varphi \), tells us that \( d_h > d_{\ell} \) and \( L_h > L_{\ell} \).

The interesting question from our perspective is to find out in what way the second-best allocation of an \( i \)-type differs on the basis of his tag (belonging to the positive- or zero-inheritance group). To address this issue, compare the first-order conditions (24) pertaining to the positive-inheritance group with (25)–(30) pertaining to the zero-inheritance group. Consider first, the \( h \)-type who faces no distortion regardless of his inheritance status. Comparing (24) with (26)–(27) informs us that

\[
\widehat{d}_h = d_h, \quad \text{and} \quad \widehat{L}_h = L_h.
\] (31)

Observe that these equalities arise not only because of the no-distortion at the top property but also the quasi-linearity of preferences. This latter property directs any
potential differences in allocations due to income effects towards individuals’ first-period consumption levels. Comparison of (24) with (25) reveals the impact of income effects. We have $\hat{U}_h < U_h$. Rather counter-intuitively, the high-ability type who is the beneficiary of an accidental bequest ends up with less utility than his counterpart who receives no inheritance. Now, with second-period consumption and leisure being the same for an $h$-type with and without an inheritance, it also follows that

$$b_{ch} < c_{ch}.$$ 

The lower level of utility enjoyed by the $h$-type who receives an inheritance, manifests itself in a lower amount of first-period consumption.

Next consider the $\ell$-types with and without an inheritance. The difference in their allocations arises from both income and incentive effects. Comparison of (24) with (29)–(30) reveals that $\hat{d}_\ell > d_\ell$ and $\hat{L}_\ell > L_\ell$. An $\ell$-type who receives an inheritance consumes more in the second period and works more in the first as compared to an $\ell$-type who receives no inheritance. This is due to his facing no distortions when he receives an inheritance but facing them when he has no inheritance. Turning to utility levels, comparing (24) with (28) informs us that

$$\hat{U}_\ell > U_\ell.$$ 

The $\ell$-type enjoys a higher level of utility if he receives an inheritance. However, these inequalities do not allow us to compare $c_{\ell}$ and $c_\ell$.

To complete the discussion, we now ascertain the correctness of our initial assumption that observability of bequests identifies recipients’ types. One can do this despite the fact that accidental bequests take three distinct values but we have only two types of recipients. The identification follows from our finding that $\hat{d}_h = d_h > \hat{d}_\ell > d_\ell$. Given these properties, leaving behind $\hat{d}_h = d_h$ indicates that the deceased must have been of type $h$ while leaving either $\hat{d}_\ell$ or $d_\ell$ indicates type $\ell$. The assumption of a dynastically immutable family type then establishes the recipient’s type.
4.2 Tax policy

Tax policy is set in order to implement the second-best allocations characterized by (15)–(17) for the $h$- and $\ell$-types in the positive-inheritance group and (18)–(23) for the $h$- and $\ell$-types in the zero-inheritance group. To achieve this, the policy specifies an implementing tax schedule, $T(I, s, \omega)$, as a function of the observable variables: income, savings, and inheritance.\(^{21}\) In what follows, we state the properties of this function with respect to income and savings briefly, and then concentrate on the properties that pertain to the taxation of bequests.

The properties of $T(I, s, \omega)$ with respect to income follow those of the Mirrlees optimal income tax problem and thus are well-known. The properties of $T(I, s, \omega)$ with respect to saving is derived in the Appendix. Suffice it to say here that implementation requires saving subsidies as it did in the first best. Now recall that in the first best, savings are subsidized at a rate equal to $1 - \pi_h$ for the $h$-type and $1 - \pi_\ell$ for the $\ell$-type whether or not they receive an inheritance. In the second best, only the $h$-type faces the same subsidy rate regardless of his inheritance status. Moreover, the subsidy rate is the same as in the first best. The treatment of the $\ell$-type, on the other hand, depends on whether he receives an inheritance or not. If he does, he will face a marginal subsidy rate of $1 - \pi_\ell$ as in the first best. If he does not, he will face a smaller marginal subsidy rate.\(^{22}\) This subsidy rate is, however, independent of the inheritance level, $\omega_\ell$ or $\hat{\omega}_\ell$.

Turning to bequest taxation, consider first the treatment of high-ability individuals. They inherit either nothing or $\omega_h = d_h = \hat{d}_h$. They pay a tax equal to $T_h = T(I_h, s_h, 0) = I_h - c_h - d_h$ if they receive no inheritance and $\hat{T}_h = T(\hat{I}_h, \hat{s}_h, \omega_h) = \ldots$\(^{21}\)

\(^{21}\) As pointed out by a referee, the tax is formally conditioned on inheritances and not on types (even when inheritances fully reveal the types). Observe also that the tax can also be conditioned on $c$ (a variable that is inferred from observability of the other variables). However, this would be a redundant argument for the tax function.

\(^{22}\)The reason for the lower marginal subsidy rate comes from Cremer and Gahvari’s (1995) original result that uncertain earnings provide a rationale for taxation of savings; see Banks and Diamond (2010, p 564) for a discussion. In the present context, this arises because, with high-skilled individuals valuing second-period consumption more than the low-skilled, taxation of savings relative to the first-best—lowering its first-best subsidy—slackens the otherwise binding self-selection constraint.
\[ \hat{I}_h + \omega_h - \bar{c}_h - \hat{d}_h = \hat{I}_h - \bar{c}_h \] if they do. Now, from equations (31)–(32), \( \hat{d}_h = d_h, \hat{I}_h = I_h \), and \( \bar{c}_h < c_h \). Hence \( \hat{T}_h - T_h = d_h + (c_h - \bar{c}_h) = \omega_h + (c_h - \bar{c}_h) \), and
\[ \hat{T}_h - T_h > \omega_h. \]

Consequently, the difference between an \( h \)-type’s total tax liabilities if he receives an inheritance and if he does not, exceeds the inheritance he may receive. In this sense, the high-ability individuals face a tax on accidental bequests that is higher than 100%. This should not be surprising if one remembers that a high-ability person’s type is revealed when he inherits \( \omega_h \), but that his type remains unidentified otherwise. With his ability known, an \( h \)-type who receives an inheritance enjoys no “informational rent” over an \( \ell \)-type who too receives an inheritance. The symmetry of the social welfare function then implies that the \( h \)-types in this group end up with the same utility level as the \( \ell \)-types. On the other hand, since the ability of an \( h \)-type who inherits nothing remains private information, he enjoys some informational rent.

Comparing how the \( \ell \)-types in positive- and zero-inheritance groups fare is rather more complicated. In any given generation, some of the \( \ell \)-types have received no inheritance at all, some have received \( \omega_\ell = d_\ell \), and some \( \hat{\omega}_\ell = \hat{d}_\ell \). But an \( \ell \)-type’s allocation depends only on whether he has received an inheritance or not; those who have inherited \( \omega_\ell \) get an identical allocation to those who have inherited \( \hat{\omega}_\ell \). Specifically, an \( \ell \)-type who inherits nothing plans for a future consumption level of \( d_\ell \), while an \( \ell \)-type who has inherited either \( \omega_\ell \) or \( \hat{\omega}_\ell \) plans for a consumption level of \( \hat{d}_\ell \). This tells us that the \( \ell \)-types who inherit \( \hat{\omega}_\ell \) pay, effectively, a tax on their extra inheritance, \( \hat{\omega}_\ell - \omega_\ell \), at a rate of 100\%. One can then consider the tax paid on \( \hat{\omega}_\ell \) as consisting of two parts: One part is paid on inheritances up to \( \omega_\ell \); this tax is identical to the inheritance tax paid by those who receive only \( \omega_\ell \). This is followed by a tax on the remaining \( \hat{\omega}_\ell - \omega_\ell \) inheritance; this is levied at a confiscatory rate.

\[ \text{Thus an } \ell \text{-type who has inherited } \omega_\ell \text{ and an } \ell \text{-type who has inherited } \hat{\omega}_\ell \text{ would leave } \hat{\omega}_\ell \text{ in bequests if they die early.} \]
Beyond this, one cannot, at this level of generality, determine whether the tax on $\omega_t$ is smaller or larger than 100%. Specifically, the finding $\hat{U}_t > U_t$ does not allow one to conclude that the net disposable income of an $\ell$-type with an inheritance is larger than that of an $\ell$-type with no inheritance.\textsuperscript{24} The reason is that the $\ell$-types with no inheritance face a distortion on their consumption bundle and their lower utility level may very well be due to this distortion. More interestingly, perhaps, is that our results do not guarantee $\hat{T}_t - T_t$ to be positive. Put differently, the $\ell$-types may even face a bequest subsidy.

The main results of this section are summarized in the following proposition.

**Proposition 2** Consider the society described in Proposition 1 but assume that individual types are not publicly observable while income, consumption levels, and bequests are.

(i) The second best solution has the following properties: (a) Individuals can be partitioned into two groups (tags): Those who receive an accidental bequest and those who do not. The characteristics of people in the first group can be inferred from their bequests and they will be given a first-best tax schedule. The characteristics of people in the second group remain private information and they will face a standard Mirrlees optimal tax problem. (b) The high-ability individuals who receive an inheritance lose all their informational rent and $\hat{U}_h = \hat{U}_t$. (c) Individuals in the zero-inheritance group face no distortion at the top and a downward distortion on labor supply and savings for the $\ell$-types. The $h$-types in this group enjoy some informational rent so that $U_h > U_t$.

(ii) Second-best allocation of the $h$-types in the positive- and zero-inheritance groups differ according to $\hat{c}_h < c_h$, $\hat{d}_h = d_h$, $L_h = L_h$, and we have $\hat{U}_h < U_h$.

(iii) In every generation, some of the $\ell$-types have inherited $\hat{\omega}_t = \hat{d}_t$, some $\omega_t = d_t$, and some nothing. Second-best allocation for the $\ell$-types is such that all individuals who have received an inheritance will, regardless of their inheritance level, receive the same

\textsuperscript{24}This amounts to saying that one cannot conclude $\omega_t - \hat{T}_t$ to be larger than $-T_t$.\textsuperscript{20}
consumption bundle and enjoy the same level of utility \( \hat{U}_\ell \). Allocations of the positive- and the zero-inheritance groups differ according to \( \hat{a}_\ell > d_\ell, \hat{L}_\ell > L_\ell \), and we have \( \hat{U}_\ell > U_\ell \).

(iv) Decentralization of second-best allocations requires: (a) Marginal saving subsidies; (b) High-ability individuals face a bequest tax of more then 100\% \( (\hat{T}_h - T_h > \omega_h) \); (c) Low-ability individuals face a bequest tax that can be smaller as well as larger than 100\% and may even be negative \( (\hat{T}_\ell - T_\ell < \omega_\ell, \hat{T}_\ell - T_\ell > \omega_\ell, \text{or } \hat{T}_\ell - T_\ell < 0) \).

5 Opting out

A striking feature of our results is that the bequest tax may exceed 100\%. One may consider this possibility as “unrealistic” in that legal systems often allow individuals to refuse an inheritance. From a strictly informational perspective, this should make no difference for our setup. The individual who refuses a bequest can still be tagged (the information on his ability status has been revealed). On practical grounds, however, this poses a challenge to our results. Another objection is that children may prevail upon their parents to write a will that leaves their estate, in case of death, to charitable organizations (and not to their children). To address these objections, and to have implementing tax functions that are compatible with existing legal structures, this section reconsiders the question of accidental bequests under the assumption that one can not be made worse off as a result of receiving an inheritance.

To study this problem, all one has to do is to add two new incentive constraints, \( \hat{U}_h \geq U_h \) and \( \hat{U}_\ell \geq U_\ell \), to our previous second-best problem. Recalling that the solution to that problem satisfied the latter of these two constraints, we proceed as follows. We impose only the \( \hat{U}_h \geq U_h \) constraint on the problem and verify ex post that the solution does not violate the other constraint, \( \hat{U}_\ell \geq U_\ell \). The Lagrangian expression of the government’s problem is then written as

\[
\mathcal{L}_V = \sum_{i=h,\ell} n_i \left[ \pi_i \left( v \left( c_i + \pi_i \beta_1 \phi (d_i) - \varphi \left( \frac{I_i}{w_i} \right) \right) + \mu (I_i - c_i - \pi_i d_i) \right) \right]
\]
On the basis of the first-order conditions, one can derive three conclusions regarding the nature of the solution in this case and how it compares to the second-best solution we had previously.

First, the presence of the extra constraint $\hat{U}_h = U_h$ implies that we no longer offer the individuals with an inheritance a non-distorted solution. In particular, the solution is no longer characterized by equal utilities for $h$- and $\ell$-types (i.e., we no longer have $\hat{U}_h = \hat{U}_\ell$). To see combine the first-order conditions with respect to $\hat{c}_\ell$ and $\hat{c}_h$ to get

$$n_h (1 - \pi_h) \left[ v' \left( \hat{U}_h \right) - v' \left( \hat{U}_\ell \right) \right] + \gamma = 0.$$ 

This relationship implies $v' \left( \hat{U}_h \right) - v' \left( \hat{U}_\ell \right) < 0$ so that $\hat{U}_h > \hat{U}_\ell$. This is quite interesting. It tells us that constraining $\hat{U}_h$ not to be smaller than $U_h$ accords the $h$-types of the positive-inheritance group to enjoy a rent that they did not have previously (compared to the $\ell$-types in the same group).

Second, consider how the $h$-types fare in the two tagged groups. Use the first-order condition with respect to $\hat{c}_h$ and $c_h$ together with $\hat{U}_h = U_h$ and rearrange to get $\lambda - \gamma = \pi_h \lambda$.

Now replace $\gamma$ in the equation $\partial L_V / \partial \hat{d}_h = 0$ by $(1 - \pi_h) \lambda$, $(\lambda - \gamma)$ in equation $\partial L_V / \partial d_h = 0$ by $\pi_h \lambda$, and compare the resulting expressions, using $\hat{U}_h = U_h$, to show that $\hat{d}_h = d_h$. A similar argument establishes that $\hat{I}_h = I_h$. This tells us that the $h$-types are treated identically whether they receive an inheritance or not; pooling them together is optimal. The implication of this result is that $h$-types should now face a confiscatory tax on their inheritance. This is not surprising. Without the added $\hat{U}_h \geq U_h$ constraint, $\hat{U}_h$ will be smaller than $U_h$ and $h$-types face a more than 100%
bequest tax. With the added constraint, and given that pooling is optimal, one cannot go beyond 100%.

Third, turning to the $\ell$-type individuals, we observe that the first-order conditions remain exactly the same as previously (in Section 4). Consequently, all our results pertaining to this group remain valid. This also serves as the ex-post verification that the $\hat{U}_h \geq U_\ell$ constraint we had ignored is not violated. As far as the tax treatment of bequests are concerned, we have, as previously, that the tax for $\ell$-types can be anything from a subsidy to a tax that exceeds the 100% mark.

These results are summarized as:

**Proposition 3** Consider the society described in Proposition 2 but assume that nobody can be made worse off as a result of receiving an inheritance.

(i) The high-ability types in the positive-inheritance group enjoy a rent as compared to the low-ability types in the group. That is, $\hat{U}_h > \hat{U}_\ell$ replaces $\hat{U}_h = \hat{U}_\ell$ result of Proposition 2.

(ii) All high-ability types receive the same allocation regardless of their inheritance status. Thus $\hat{U}_h = U_h$ replaces $\hat{U}_h < U_h$, and bequest tax of 100% replaces a bequest tax of more than 100%, results of Proposition 2.

(iii) All the results of Proposition 2 pertaining to the low-ability types remain valid. In particular, low-ability types face a bequest tax that can be smaller as well as larger than 100% and may even be negative.

6 Summary and conclusion

This paper has questioned the validity of the conventional wisdom that purely accidental bequests should be taxed at a confiscatory rate. It has employed a model wherein individuals of different abilities may live for one or for two periods with different probabilities of survival. It has shown that the proposition is correct in a first-best environment when individuals’ productivity and longevity are publicly observable. Under this
circumstance, subsidizing each ability-type’s saving at a rate equal to his probability of an early death, in conjunction with lump-sum taxes that vary according to individuals’ ability types and inheritance status, mimics a perfect annuity market. All accidental bequests are taxed at 100% and all individuals enjoy the same level of utility.

In the second-best, individual abilities and survival probabilities are publicly unobservable. Assuming that types and survival probabilities are positively correlated, individuals can be partitioned into two groups (tags). The first group consists of people who receive an accidental bequest and the second of those who receive nothing. The characteristics of people in the first group can be inferred from their bequests and they will be given a first-best tax schedule. The characteristics of people in the second group remains private information and they will have to face a standard Mirrlees optimal tax problem.

With their ability type being inferred, the high-ability individuals in the group of people who receive an inheritance enjoy no informational rent and will end up with the same utility level as the low-ability types in this group. On the other hand, high-ability types in the group of people who receive no inheritance enjoy an informational rent. This implies that high-ability types will be better off if they do not receive an inheritance. Similar comparison for low-ability types reveals that they will be better off receiving an inheritance. In this sense, accidental bequests are a curse for the rich and a boon for the poor. Finally, to decentralize these allocations, one must levy marginal saving subsidies that vary with income and inheritance status but not with the inheritance level. High-ability individuals face a bequest tax of more than 100%, while low-ability individuals face a bequest tax that can be smaller as well as larger than 100% and may even be negative.

Finally, we studied the implications for our results if people are able to refuse the inheritances that are due to them. We showed that in this case, high-ability types in the positive-inheritance group enjoy a rent as compared to the low-ability types in the group. We also showed that all high-ability types are pooled together and receive the

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same allocation regardless of their inheritance status. Consequently, they will face a bequest tax of 100% rather than one which exceeds 100%. As far as the low-ability types are concerned, however, all of our previous results remain intact. Specifically, low-ability types continue to face a bequest tax that can be smaller as well as larger than 100% and may even be negative.

We conclude by revisiting two of the paper’s main assumptions. First, we have considered a highly stylized setting wherein the observability of bequests brings about a drastic change in the structure of information available to the tax authority. This drastic change comes about from the assumption that types are dynastically immutable: if a person is of a given type, his offsprings will also be of the same type. In following this approach, we have been led by a desire to convey our point in a crisp fashion with no ambiguity. A more realistic setting posits only that there is a high probability—and not a certainty—for children to be of the same type as their parents. Our main point, that incorporating the informational content of bequests improves the design of tax structures, including bequest taxes, should remain valid in this more realistic setting. The specifics of the optimal tax policy would of course become more complicated.

Second, we have assumed that individual’s preferences are quasi-linear. Accordingly, in the laissez-faire, an individual’s second-period consumption, and thus his saving which constitutes the accidental bequest, does not depend on the bequest received (there is no income effect). This assumption simplifies the analysis but it is not crucial for the main results of our paper. To be more precise, its relevance is confined to the laissez-faire allocation; limiting the equilibrium levels of positive accidental bequests at the steady state (to two). It plays no such role for first- and second best allocations. With more general preferences too, the tagging is between those who inherit nothing and those who inherit something (not how much). It thus remains optimal to treat all individuals of a given type identically regardless of the size of their inheritance. We will then have four bequest levels, rather than three under quasilinear preferences. As long as one can order the four bequest levels all our results will go through.
Appendix

A Characterization of marginal saving subsidies

Faced with the tax function $T(I, s, \omega)$, the $i$-type in the positive-inheritance group chooses $I$ and $s$ to maximize

$$\hat{U}_i = I + \omega - T(I, s, \omega) - d + \pi_i \beta_i \phi(s) - \varphi \left( \frac{I}{w_i} \right),$$

and the $i$-type in the zero-inheritance group chooses $I$ and $s$ to maximize

$$U_i = I - T(I, s, 0) - d + \pi_i \beta_i \phi(s) - \varphi \left( \frac{I}{w_i} \right).$$

Denote the partial derivative of $T(\cdot)$ with respect to $s$ by $T_s(\cdot)$. The first-order condition with respect to $s$, whether one is in the positive or zero-inheritance group, is then equal to

$$-T_s(I, s, \omega) - 1 + \pi_i \beta_i \phi'(s) = 0.$$

Substituting the second-best value of $\beta_i \phi'(s)$ from (24) for everyone who receives an inheritance, and from (26) and (29) for $h$- and $\ell$-types who do not receive an inheritance, yields the following marginal saving subsidies:

$$-T_s \left( \hat{I}_i, \hat{s}_i, \omega_i \right) = 1 - \pi_i \beta_i \phi'(\hat{s}_i) = 1 - \pi_i, \quad i = h, \ell,$$

$$-T_s (I_h, s_h, 0) = 1 - \pi_h \beta_h \phi'(s_h) = 1 - \pi_h,$$

$$-T_s (I_\ell, s_\ell, 0) = 1 - \pi_\ell \beta_\ell \phi'(s_\ell) = 1 - \pi_\ell \left[ \frac{\lambda \phi'(s_\ell)}{\mu_i \pi_i \pi_\ell} \left( \beta_i \frac{\pi_h}{\pi_\ell} - \beta_\ell \right) \right].$$
References


